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THE
Defendant Proimtu MMI, LLC ("Defendant") files this Response to Appellant's Brief
and Cross-Brief and respectfully requests that the Court affirm the trial court's February 12,
2016 Memorandum Decision and Order and the Court's March 30, 2016 Order dismissing the
lawsuit. Defendant further requests that the Court reverse the trial court's improper grant of
Plaintiff's Motion to Disallow Defendant's Request for Costs as the Court abused its discretion
in failing to award mandatory costs and fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(1 ).
This

lawsuit

involves

two

Nevada companies

(i.e.,

Appellant/Plaintiff H20

Environmental, Inc. ("Plaintiff') and Defendant) and the consequences of an alleged oral
contract to pay all employment costs, including employment taxes, for construction labor to be
performed in Nevada by Nevada employees.

Similarly, Defendant is a "Nevada company

licensed to do business in the State of Nevada." R. Vol. 1, P. 000004, L. 6-7; R. Vol. 1, P.
000005, L. 1-2. Defendant does not maintain an office or have agents in Idaho.
Plaintiff and Defendant are Nevada companies that provide construction labor. R. Vol. 1,
P. 000004, L. 4-7; R. Vol. 1, P. 000005, L. 1-4.

Plaintiff filed its original Articles of

Incorporation in Nevada and is registered as a Nevada "domestic corporation." R. Vol. 1, P.
000120, L. 22-23. Plaintiff engages a registered agent also located in Nevada. R. Vol. 1, P.
000120, L. 22-23. Even Plaintiff's own website lists the entity as a Nevada company. R. Vol. 1,
P. 000120, L. 24.
Defendant commissioned Plaintiff to hire and employ Nevada-based construction
laborers for a solar project in Tonopah, Nevada. R. Vol. l, P. 000120, L. 1-2. The project
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as
Vol. 1, P. 000120, L. 3-4.
At the time the Parties first engaged in communication, Defendant believed Plaintiff was
an Arizona company as the first contact between the two took place in Arizona. R. Vol. l, P,
000120, L. 5-7. Defendant was entirely unaware of Plaintiff's purported headquarters in Idaho.
R. Vol. 1, P. 000120, L. 5-7.

The main communication between Plaintiff and Defendant

involved emails and phone calls and Defendant was unaware of the particular location of any of
Plaintiff's employees with whom Defendant communicated and whom Plaintiff now alleges
were in Idaho at the time. R. Vol. 1, P. 000120, L. 8-9. Defendant did not, and had no reason to,
believe that it was availing itself of Idaho jurisdiction.

R. Vol. 1, P. 000120, L. 10-11.

Furthermore, in the Parties' contract, Plaintiff identified itself as a "Nevada corporation" and
identified its place of business as 2364 S. Airport Blvd., Chandler, AZ 85286. R. Vol. 1, P.
000120, L. 12-15.
Aside from sending emails, making occasional phone calls and mailing paystubs to
representatives of Plaintiff at an Idaho address, Defendant never knowingly had any direct
contact with individuals in Idaho. R. Vol. 1, P. 000120, L. 16-18. Defendant never intentionally
traveled to Idaho during the duration of time relevant to this lawsuit and never sought to do
business of any nature whatsoever in Idaho. R. Vol. 1, P. 000120, L. 19-21.
Approximately two years after the Parties entered into a business arrangement, the
Department of Labor launched an investigation against several entities employing construction
workers at the Tonopah Solar Project.

R. Vol. 1, P. 000006, L. 8-11.
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The results of the

subsequently filed suit in Idaho. R. Vol. 1,

000004,

1-25.

On August 20, 2015, Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction and its Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. R. Vol. 1, P. 000009, L. 1-25; R. Vol. 1, P. 000012,
L. 1-25.

The trial court filed a Memorandum Decision on February 12, 2016 granting

Defendant's Motion and an Order on March 30, 2016 dismissing the lawsuit. R. Vol. 1, P.
000150, L. 1-25; R. Vol. 1, P. 000158, L. 1-25. Defendant filed its Statement of Costs on April
13, 2016. R. Vol. 1, P. 000168, L. 2. Ultimately, the trial court determined in its Memorandum
Decision and Order filed June 17, 2016 that Defendant did not waive its lack of personal
jurisdiction defense by filing its Statement of Costs but granted Plaintiff's Motion to Disallow
Defendant's Request for Costs. R. Vol. 1, P. 000224, L. 4-5.
ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether the District Court erred in denying reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to
Defendant pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-120(1), as the prevailing party in a dispute valued
at less than $35,000.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Defendant is seeking attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §12-120(1).
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ARGUMENT
I.

Standard of Review.

The issue of whether a court has personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant is a
question of law. Wilson v. King, 160 Idaho 344, 346, 372 P.3d 399, 401 (2016). As such, the
issue is subject to de novo review. See id.
II.

The Federal Due Process Clause Controls in This Lawsuit.

To exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, "two criteria must be
met; the act giving rise to the cause of action must fall within the scope of [Idaho's] long-arm
statute and the constitutional standards of due process must be met." St. Alphonsus Reg 'l Med.

Ctr. v. State of Wash., 123 Idaho 739, 742, 852 P.2d 491, 494 (1993) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction is proper, and Plaintiff was unable to
do so at the trial court and has not met that burden in its appellate brief either. See Doe v.

Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 924 (9th Cir. 2001); Donaldson v. Donaldson, 111 Idaho 951, 957,
729 P.2d 426, 432 (Idaho App. 1986).
Idaho's long-arm statute, Idaho Code §5-514, allows a broader reach of personal
jurisdiction than the federal Due Process Clause. See Smalley v. Kaiser, 130 Idaho 909, 913, 950
P.2d 1248, 1252 (1997) (finding that a defendant's conduct did fall within Idaho's long-arm
statute, but that jurisdiction could not be exercised over the defendant under the Due Process
Clause); St. Alphonsus, 123 Idaho at 744, 852 P.2d at 496 (same). However, as Idaho's long
arm-statute is broader than the Due Process Clause, the Court need only look to the Due Process

9

Wells Cargo Inc. v. Transport Ins.

, 676

Supp. 2d 1114, 1119 n. 2 (D. Idaho 2009)

(holding that Smalley and St. Alphonsus imply that Idaho's long-aim statutes "reaches beyond
the limits of due process, and that the Idaho Supreme Court must use the Due Process Clause to
rein in the statute's grasp"). 1

III.

The Trial Court Correctly Determined That the Contacts Were Insufficient and
Defendant Did Not Purposefully Avail Itself of the Privilege of Conducting Business
in Idaho to Invoke Specific Personal Jurisdiction in Idaho.
To determine whether Idaho can exercise personal jurisdiction over the Defendant, the

trial court must determine: (1) whether Defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities in Idaho and thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; and
(2) whether Defendant had certain minimum contacts with Idaho such that the maintenance of
the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Schneider v.

Sverdsten Logging Co., 104 Idaho 210, 212 657 P.2d 1078, 1080 (1983) (quoting Hansen v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958), and Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
Neither of these two requirements is met in this lawsuit.
1

Even if the Idaho long-arm statute somehow applied to the analysis of whether the trial court
may exert personal jurisdiction over the Defendant, the analysis under the Idaho statute is still
insufficient to subject Defendant to personal jurisdiction. Assuming arguendo that Defendant
engaged in a telephone call as alleged by Plaintiff, minor communications to negotiate a contract
is insufficient to qualify as "transacting business" for purposes of Idaho's long-arm statute. See
Telford v. Smith Cnty. Tex., 155 Idaho 497, 314 P.3d 179 (2013) (finding nine telephone calls,
two faxes, and six emails sent to Idaho by the defendants during the negotiation to be insufficient
to confer Idaho jurisdiction).
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Defendant did not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting

activities in Idaho.

Plaintiff cites to three separate arguments in an attempt to establish specific personal
jurisdiction in Idaho, including: (1) that the email signature of Plaintiff's Chief Financial Officer
("CFO") was sufficient indication of the location of the recipient upon receiving an email; (2)
that the payroll work for the Nevada-based Tonopah project was performed in Idaho; and (3) that
the location to which payroll was mailed as required by Plaintiff were somehow not the result of
H20's unilateral activity. See Appellant's Brief, at 6-9. However, these issues were analyzed by
the trial court and that court correctly determined that the alleged contacts were insufficient to
invoke specific personal jurisdiction in Idaho.
Plaintiff ignores the case law and analysis which the trial court should and did apply to
the issue of specific personal jurisdiction. For the trial court to have personal jurisdiction over
Defendant, Defendant must have purposefully availed itself of doing business in the forum.

Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008). This means that Defendant "must
have 'performed some type of affirmative conduct which allows or promotes the transaction of
business within the forum state."' Boschetto, 539 F.3d at 1016 (quoting Sher v. Johnson, 911
F.2d 1357, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990)).
First, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly, and very recently, held that the relevant
jurisdictional question asks "whether the defendant's conduct connects him to the forum in a
meaningful way." Walden v. Fiore, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 1125 (2014). To answer this question,

Walden extensively analyzed the issue of whether knowledge of a plaintiffs residence or the

11

IS

availment and to exert specific personal jurisdiction.

Id. at 1124-25.

The Supreme Court

determined that the mere knowledge of such information is insufficient to constitute purposeful
availment. ld; see also Phillips v. Prairie Eye Ctr., 530 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that
courts have held "in a variety of contexts, that the defendant's awareness of the location of the
plaintiff is not, on its own, enough to create personal jurisdiction over a defendant"); accord

Harlow v. Children's Hosp., 432 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2005) (rejecting argument that because
defendant knew plaintiff resided in Maine, jurisdiction was proper because "[j]urisdiction cannot
be created by and does not travel with the plaintiff patient wherever she goes"). Thus, regardless
of whether the email signature of Plaintiff's CFO or the W-9 included an Idaho address, the mere
knowledge of the CFO' s residence or location is not sufficient to argue that purposeful
availment, and by extension personal jurisdiction, exists in this case.
Second, Plaintiff's statements regarding the location of Plaintiff's provision of services to
Defendant misconstrues the law. The unilateral activities of the plaintiff are irrelevant under a
personal jurisdiction analysis. Phillips, 530 F.2d at 28 (requiring that a defendant's contacts
"must be deliberate, and 'not based on the unilateral actions of another party") (quoting Adelson

v. Hananel, 510 F.3d 43, 50 (1st Cir. 2007)). Plaintiff cannot project its own Idaho efforts and
activities onto Defendant. If Plaintiff's activities could be imputed to Defendant, every Plaintiff
would have the ability to unilaterally confer personal jurisdiction on behalf of any defendant.
Plaintiff's repeated references to its own activities in Idaho are an unpersuasive attempt
to claim that Plaintiff was headquartered in Idaho at the time the Parties contracted for
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Defendant would have divined Plaintiff's Idaho connection rather than relying on the
representation of Plaintiff as a Nevada entity and the location in which the initial contract
between the Parties took place. Plaintiff's corporate entry on the Nevada Secretary of State
website identifies Plaintiff as a domestic entity. Plaintiff's own website portrays Plaintiff as a
Nevada entity in both its description of genesis of the entity and two of its five locations. In the
Parties' contract, Plaintiff identified itself as a "Nevada corporation" and identified its place of
business as 2364 S. Airport Blvd., Chandler, AZ 85286. With all of this information, Defendant
understandably believed that when it entered into the contract with Plaintiff for the Tonopah
project, it was contracting with a Nevada entity which performed work in Arizona and Nevada.
Third, minor emails and phone calls are insufficient to subject a defendant to a foreign
forum. See Rupert v. Bond, 68 F. Supp. 3d 1142, 1168 (N.D. Cal. 2014) ("Courts have been
clear that the sending of a single email, or even a series of emails, by itself, does not amount to
purposeful availment."); see e.g., Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 729 (E.D. Pa.
1999) (finding that two emails sent from a defendant to a plaintiff resident in the forum "(d]id
not show purposeful availment"); Machulsky v. Hall, 210 F. Supp. 2d 531, 542 (D.N.J. 2002)
(holding that "minimal correspondence" via email "does not constitute sufficient minimum
contacts" for purposes of personal jurisdiction); Aaron Ferer & Sons Co. v. Atlas Scrap Iron &

Metal Co., 558 F.2d 450, 455 (8th Cir. 1977) ("The letters and telephone calls in this purely
commercial setting did not supply the necessary minimal contact"); see also Adv. Tactical

Ordinance Sys., LLC, 751 F.3d 796, 802-03 (2014) (holding that "[t]he connection between the
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"

matter, email does not exist in any location at all").
Intermittent correspondence, i.e., an occasional email, phone call, and mailing of a
reimbursement check, is the only act hy Defendant that Plaintiff alleges alters the nature of
Plaintiffs unilateral activity. Plaintiffs arguments conflate Plaintiffs and Defendant's acts to
erroneously assert that Defendant availed itself of the opportunity of doing business in Idaho.
Defendant never travelled to Idaho at any point during the project or time at issue in the lawsuit.
The sole use of email, which is indisputedly the only Idaho-based attenuated contact is the
quintessential example of a contact so miniscule and attenuated that the vast majority of courts
describe it as so random, fortuitous, or attenuated that it cannot constitute purposeful availment.
See e.g., LAK, Inc. v. Deer Creek Enters., 885 F.2d 1293, 1300 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494

U.S. 1056 (1990); Am. Greetings Corp. v. Cohn, 839 F.2d 1164, 1169 (6th Cir. 1988); Kerry
Steel, Inc. v. Paragon Indus., Inc., 106 F.3d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 1987) ("It is immaterial that

Paragon placed telephone calls and sent faxes to Kerry Steel in Michigan."); Scullin Steel Co. v.
Nat'! Ry. Utilization Corp., 676 F.2d 309,314 (8th Cir. 1982) ("The use of interstate facilities

(telephone, the mail), the making of payments in the forum state, and the provision for delivery
within the forum state are secondary or ancillary factors and cannot alone provide the 'minimum
contacts' required by due process"); Aaron Ferer & Sons. Co., 558 F.2d at 455 ("The letters and
telephone calls in this purely commercial setting did not supply the necessary minimal contact.").
Plaintiff tried to bolster its argument by citing to Southern Idaho Piper & Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut
Pipe & Supply, Inc., 98 Idaho 495, 567 P.2d 1246 (1977), to suggest that the contacts with Idaho
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a multitude of communications including contacts with more than one business in the state and
affirmative solicitation via advertising circulars. 98 Idaho at 497, 567 P.2d at 1248. Thus, the
case is vastlv
. different from the minimal interactions and communications Plaintiff alleges
- in this
lawsuit and cannot support Plaintiffs argument.
Defendant never intentionally conducted any business in Idaho and any minor emails or
phone calls, especially given Defendant's belief that Plaintiff was a Nevada entity based on
Plaintiff's own assertions, cannot create an impression of purposeful availment. If a plaintiff can
subject a defendant to personal jurisdiction in any location by requiring the defendant to mail a
check to a particular jurisdiction after a contract was formed, the entire concept of voluntary
purposeful availment would become futile. Plaintiff forced Defendant to send mail and email to
Plaintiff in Idaho by their request; Defendant did not intend to subject itself to suit in Idaho or to
purposefully avail itself of doing business in Idaho.
The trial court correctly determined that the mmor contacts were not sufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction and that Defendant did not purposefully avail itself of doing
business in Idaho. On appeal Plaintiff does not provide a legal basis to support a finding that
Defendant purposefully availed itself of doing business in Idaho.

15

Subjecting Defendant to Idaho jurisdiction would not comport with
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Even assuming Defendant had purposefully availed itself of Idaho jurisdiction, exercising
personal jurisdiction over Defendant must comport with "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice." Smalley, 130 Idaho at 913, 950 P.2d at 1252. This determination analyzes:
(1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining the most convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial
system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared
interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. Id.; see also
CE Distrib., LLC v. New Sensor Corp., 380 F.4d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004) (additionally

considering "the extent of the defendants' purposeful interjection into the forum state's affairs"
and "the existence of an alternative forum").
However, a comprehensive and calculated analysis of those factors is unnecessary in this
matter as it distracts from the simple fact that this lawsuit involves a dispute between two
Nevada companies involving the salaries of Nevada construction workers who worked on a
solar plant in Nevada. See Aaron Ferer & Sons Co., 558 F.2d at 455 (holding that exercising
personal jurisdiction over the defendant would offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice in part because the "contracts at issue here were not to be performed in any
part" within the forum state and thus have "no substantial connection" to the forum state).
Although Plaintiff's Complaint attempts to minimize the common "Nevada" thread that binds the
domicile of the parties, the alleged substance of the contract (i.e., to obtain Nevada workers) and

16

resonates
entire dispute and cannot be overstated. Although Plaintiff may prefer the convenience of
litigating the matter in Idaho because its officers reside in Idaho, such "convenience ... is not
determinative." ld The notions of fair play and substantial justice warrant litigating the dispute
in Nevada where the parties and the center of the dispute are located, not Idaho.

IV.

The Trial Court Correctly Determined That Defendant Did Not Submit to the
Jurisdiction of Idaho By Filing Its Statement of Costs and Fees.
Plaintiff makes an equally flawed and nonsensical argument that by filing its statement of

costs and fees after its successful Motion to Dismiss, Defendant somehow submitted to Idaho
jurisdiction. However, such an outcome, under Plaintiffs argument and draconian reading of
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 4.1 ("Rule 4.1 ") would allow even the simple filing of a proposed
judgment to subject a defendant to Idaho jurisdiction - an outcome that is surely not the intended
purpose of the Rule.
First, Defendant's Statement of Costs is not a "pleading" within the meaning of Rule 4.1
that would support a finding of voluntary submission to personal jurisdiction. Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 7(a) defines a pleading as a complaint and answer, a reply to a counterclaim, an
answer to a cross-claim, a third-party complaint, a third-party answer, and a reply to an answer
or a third-party answer. See Rhino Metals, Inc. v. Craft, 146 Idaho 319,321, 193 P.3d 866,868
(2008). Thus a "pleading" is "[a] formal document in which a party to a legal proceeding
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to

not a statement of costs. See Black's Law Dictionary 573 (4th pocket ed. 2011).
Second, Rule 4.1 does not define "appearance," and as a result Idaho courts have
determined that an appearance is conduct by a defendant that "evidenced an intent to defend the
action." See Donaldson, 111 Idaho at 954, 729 P.2d at 429. Similar to the letter sent by the
husband to the court in Donaldson, Defendant's Statement of Costs does not evidence an intent
to defend against Plaintiff's claims in Idaho. The Statement of Costs is rather a filing meant to
comply with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 and Idaho Code § 12-120(1 ).
Third, Defendant did not seek affirmative relief. Plaintiff's only support for its argument
otherwise is a citation to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff ignores that Idaho Code
§12-120(1) provides:

In any action where the amount pleaded is thirty-five thousand
dollars ($35,000) or less, there shall be taxed and allowed to the
prevailing party, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable
amount to be fixed by the court as attorney's fees.
Idaho Code § 12-120(1) (emphasis added).

Plaintiff also ignores that Idaho Rule of Civil

Procedure 54 further provides for an award of attorneys' fees and costs. The rule states:

Parties entitled to Costs. Except when otherwise limited by these
rules, costs shall be allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing
party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
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as

statutes

or contract, shall be deemed as costs in an action and processed
the same manner as costs and included in the memorandum of
costs; provided, however, the claim for attorney fees as costs shall
be supported by an affidavit of the attorney stating the basis and
method of computation of the attorney fees claimed.
Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l)(A), (e)(5) (emphasis added); see also id 54(d)(5) (requiring that a
memorandum of costs be filed no later than 14 days after judgment).
The Idaho Supreme Court categorizes a post-judgment request for fees and costs as a
collateral issue. Inland Group of Companies, Inc. v. Obendorff, 131 Idaho 473, 475, 959 P.2d
454, 456 (1998) (citation omitted). A collateral issue does not "go to the merits of the action."

Id. (citation omitted).
Defendant's Statement of Costs did not seek affirmative relief. Defendant was not only
able to, but also required to file a memorandum of costs for the trial court to tax. See I.C. §12120(1); Idaho R. Civ. P. 54; Cf Profits Plus Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Podesta, 156 Idaho 873, 881,
332 P.3d 785, 793 (2014), reh 'g denied (sept. 15, 2014) (holding a compulsory counterclaim
filing was not a voluntary appearance to waive the defendant's personal jurisdiction).
Fourth, courts across the country have overwhelmingly established that a defendant's
statement of costs or request for fees pursuant to a successful motion to dismiss a claim does not
constitute a general appearance for purposes of personal jurisdiction. See Two Worlds United v.
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(Colo. App. 2009) ("This conclusion [i.e., seeking fees as part of a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction does not constitute a general appearance] is consistent with the holdings of most
courts that have addressed this auestion."): Heineken v. Heineken, 683 So. 2d 194, 197-98 (FL
.i

/ _;

.

'

App. 1996) (holding that a motion for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction is not an attempt to seek affirmative relief and waiver of a
personal jurisdiction defense); Grange Ins. Ass 'n v. State, 757 P.2d 933 (Wash. 1988) (rejecting
argument that the State of Idaho waived its right to object to jurisdiction when it asked the trial
court to award attorneys' fees as part of its motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction). Most of
these decisions involve an attorney fee motion or application far more comprehensive than the
simple statement of costs at issue here. See Two Worlds United v. Zylstra, 46 So. 3d at 1177;
Gognat, 224 P.3d at 1055; Heineken, 683 So. 2d at 197-98; Grange Ins. Ass 'n, 757 P.2d at 940.
Indeed, a finding that a motion for fees or statement of costs would constitute a general
appearance would be inconsistent with the purpose of the statute allowing attorney fees for a
successful motion to dismiss. See Gognat, 224 P.3d at 1054-55 (analyzing the issue under a
similar statutory scheme); Two Worlds United, 46 So. 3d at 1177 (noting that the purpose of the
statute awarding fees for defense against frivolous litigation "is to dissuade litigants and
attorneys from pursuing 'baseless claims, stonewall defenses, and sham appeals in civil litigation
by placing a price tag ... on losing parties who engage in these activities."') (quoting Vehicles v.
Salter, 710 So.2d 1039, 1041 (Fla. App. 1998)). As the Supreme Court of Wyoming stated in
Meyer v. Hatto, 198 P.3d 552, 557 (Wyo. 2008):
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fees is not an affirmative action that invokes personal jurisdiction.
Holding otherwise would allow one contracting party to force the
other party to subject itself to a foreign jurisdiction or forgo its

contractual right to attorneys' fees.
In Grange Ins. Ass 'n, the court first defined affirmative relief as that "'for which
defendant might maintain an action independently of plaintiffs claim and on which he might
proceed to recovery, although plaintiff abandoned his cause of action or failed to establish it."'
757 P.2d at 940 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 56 (5th ed. 1979)). A statement of costs or
motion for attorneys' fees is dependent on the plaintiff's claim and would not exist absent
Plaintiff's affirmative act in bringing its claim. Id at 940.
In Heineken, the court based its analysis on Grange and found that merely bringing a

motion for attorneys' fees and costs in prosecuting a motion to dismiss does not waive personal
jurisdiction defense by seeking affirmative relief. 683 So.2d at 197-98. The court highlighted
the absurdity in assuming any waiver in stating that "by the recovery of fees incurred in asserting
the jurisdictional defense[,] a defendant ... would only be placed back in the status existing before
the plaintiff sought to assert personal jurisdiction." Id. at 198.
The court in Two World United utilized Heineken to affirm that an attorneys' fee motion
does not seek affirmative-type relief and does not warrant a waiver determination. 46 So. 3d at
1177. The court found that an attorneys' fee motion is "substantively defensive in nature" and
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not
Id. at 11 77. The statement of costs here was a defensive action and filed pursuant to the statutory

requirement to do so.
Defendant would not have a right to attorneys' fees and costs had Plaintiff not brought its
lawsuit in Idaho despite the lack of personal jurisdiction. Defendant should not be forced to
choose between the statutory recovery of its incurred costs and fees and maintaining its
successful objection to the lack of personal jurisdiction.
Finally, Plaintiff improperly sought review of its alleged waiver argument via a motion
under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). R. Vol. 1, p. 000183, L. 1-5.

Plaintiff provides no

authority to support its assumption that a party may seek Rule 60 relief from a dismissal based
on a personal jurisdiction defense for an alleged waiver of such defense by filing a statement of
costs. Indeed, Plaintiff could not do so and the attempt to appeal an inappropriate and unfounded
motion is merely another attempt to force Defendant into a court in which specific personal
jurisdiction does not exist.
V.

The District Court Erred in Denying Reasonable Attorneys' Fees and Costs to
Defendant/Appellee Pursuant to Idaho Code §12-120(1)
Idaho Code § 12-120 requires that a court award attorneys' fees as a part of the costs of

an action when a party prevails in relation to a claim pleading an amount of thirty-five thousand
dollars ($35,000) or less. LC. §12-120(A) ("In any action where the amount pleaded is thirtyfive thousand dollars ($35,000) or less, there shall be taxed and allowed to the prevailing party,
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costs

court as

fees."); see also Action Collection Servs., Inc. v. Bigham, 146 Idaho 286, 290, 192 P.3d 1110,
1114 (App. 2008) ("Idaho Code Section 12-120(1) provides for a mandatory award of attorney
fees to the prevailing party where the amount pleaded is $25,000 or less."); Clement v. Franklin
Inv. Grp., Ltd., 689 F. Supp. 1575, 1577 (D. Idaho 1988) ("the Idaho Supreme Court has made it

clear that Idaho Code §12-120 is mandatory in its nature and has rejected an attempt by a trial
judge to impose his own sense of justice in denying the mandatory award.") (citing Evans v.
Sawtooth Partners, 111 Idaho 381, 723 P.2d 925 (App. 1986)). Plaintiffs Complaint requested

that judgment be entered against [Defendant] for damages for breach of contract in the amount of
$23,805.77." R. Vol. 1, P. 000008, L. 8-9. Because Plaintiffs claim as pied was less than
$35,000, Defendant is entitled to its attorneys' fees, taxed as costs, as a matter of right.
An award of attorneys' fees to be taxed as costs under Idaho Code §12-120 does not

require the party to prevail on the merits but may be awarded to a party that was successful on a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See, e.g., Idaho Transp. Dept. v. Ascorp, Inc., 159 Idaho 138, 357 P.3d
863, 866 (2015) (affirming attorneys' fee award to defendant who prevailed on Rule 12(b)(6)
motion); Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 848-49, 243 P.3d 642, 664-65 (2010) (same).
Courts in other jurisdictions have similarly awarded attorneys' fees for parties who successfully
argue a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. E.g., At!. Propeller Serv., Inc. v.
Hoffman GMBH & Co. KG, 382 S.E.2d 109, 110 (Ga. App. 1989) (affirming attorneys' fees

award to defendants who had prevailed on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction).
Some state statutes also identify the availability of fees for defendants who prevail on motions to

1

event the

defendant is personally served outside the state on causes of action enumerated in this section,
and prevails in the action, there may be taxed and allowed to the defendant as part of the costs of
defending the action a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorneys' fees.").
A party that opposes a motion to dismiss based on a lack of personal jurisdiction and
succeeds is able to recover attorneys' fees and costs on appeal under Idaho Code §12-120(3).

See Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 729, 152 P.3d 594, 600 (2007). To
allow a plaintiff to be awarded fees if it succeeds in opposition to a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction but to disallow a defendant to be awarded fees for succeeding on its motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction would provide an inconsistent and biased result.
Although the court has discretion to determine the amount of fees, the award of
attorneys' fees is mandatory. See In re Haun, 396 B.R. 522, 531 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2008). Idaho
Code § 12-120 includes a "shall" mandate requiring Defendant to file a Statement of Costs to
allow the court to fix a reasonable amount of attorneys' fees to be taxed as costs. The statute and
case law do not point to any specific information that must be provided to the court in order to
calculate a reasonable amount of attorneys' fees.
Furthermore, Defendants' costs and attorneys' fees which are to be taxed as costs were
reasonable as provided in Defendants' Statement of Costs. Plaintiff chose to bring a lawsuit in
Idaho in a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the Defendant. Plaintiff also requested
an in-person hearing in Idaho on the jurisdictional issue. Although a Statement of Costs listing
the individuals who performed work on the matter, the date the work was performed, the task
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amount

amount
particular entry

to

that

the court can extrapolate the hourly billable rate for each individual

was provided to the Court), the Court incorrectly determined that a statement of costs, i.e., the
only requirement for an award of attorneys' fees under the statute and rules, was insufficient to
determine a reasonable award of attorneys' fees. The court had sufficient information to review
to determine the reasonable attorneys' fees which should be awarded and abused its discretion by
failing to award attorneys' fees and costs.
Plaintiff's opposition provided no valid reason to dismiss any of the fees and costs
specified in the Statement of Costs. The fees, however, are mandatory, and the appropriate
statement of costs was filed; thus, the Court erred in not determining the reasonable amount of
fees to be awarded.

For the foregoing reasons Defendant respectfully requests that the Court affirm the trial
court's findings that Defendant has not purposefully availed itself of the jurisdiction ofldaho and
lacks sufficient minimum contacts to authorize the application of personal jurisdiction to its in
Idaho. Defendant further requests that the court affirm the trial court's Judgment dismissing the
lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Finally, Defendant requests that the Court grant

Defendant's appeal and reverse the trial court's determination to disallow attorneys' fees and
costs to Defendant as such fees and costs are mandatory under Idaho Code §12-120.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of December, 2016.

for Defendant/Respondent
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§ 5-514. Acts

persons to jurisdiction of courts of state, ID ST§ 5-514

KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment
Unconstitutional or Preempted Validity Called into Doubt by Wells Cargo, Inc. v. Transport Ins. Co., D.Idaho, Dec. 13, 2009

West's Idaho Code Annotated
Title 5. Proceedings in Civil Actions in Courts of Record
Chapter 5. Commencement of Actions
LC.§ 5-514
§ 5-514. Acts subjecting persons to jurisdiction of courts of state

Currentness
Any person, firm, company, association or corporation, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or
through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits said person, firm, company, association
or corporation, and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any
cause of action arising from the doing of any of said acts:

(a) The transaction of any business within this state which is hereby defined as the doing of any act for the purpose of
realizing pecuniary benefit or accomplishing or attempting to accomplish, transact or enhance the business purpose or
objective or any part thereof of such person, firm, company, association or corporation;

(b) The commission of a tortious act within this state;

(c) The ownership, use or possession of any real property situate within this state;

(d) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this state at the time of contracting;

(e) The maintenance within this state of matrimonial domicile at the time of the commission of any act giving rise to a
cause of action for divorce or separate maintenance;

(0 The engaging in an act of sexual intercourse within the state, giving rise to a cause of action for paternity under
chapter II, title 7, Idaho Code. The provisions of this subsection shall apply retroactively, and for the benefit of any
dependent child, whether born before or after the effective date of this act, and regardless of the past or current marital
status of the parents of the child.
Credits
S.L. 1961, ch. 153, § l; S.L. 1969, ch. 236, § l; S.L. 1988, ch. 106, § 1.
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LC.§

12-120

§ 12-120. Attorney's fees in civil actions

Currentness
(I) Except as provided in subsections (3) and (4) of this section, in any action where the amount pleaded is thirty-five
thousand dollars ($35,000) or less, there shall be taxed and allowed to the prevailing party, as part of the costs of the
action, a reasonable amount to be fixed by the court as attorney's fees. For the plaintiff to be awarded attorney's fees,
for the prosecution of the action, written demand for the payment of such claim must have been made on the defendant
not less than ten (I 0) days before the commencement of the action; provided, that no attorney's fees shall be allowed to
the plaintiff if the court finds that the defendant tendered to the plaintiff, prior to the commencement of the action, an
amount at least equal to ninety-five percent (95%) of the amount awarded to the plaintiff.

(2) The provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall also apply to any counterclaims, cross-claims or third party
claims which may be filed after the initiation of the original action. Except that a ten (10) day written demand letter shall
not be required in the case of a counterclaim.

(3) In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or
contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction
unless otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the court,
to be taxed and collected as costs.
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except transactions for personal or household
purposes. The term "party" is defined to mean any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization,
the state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof.

(4) In actions for personal injury, where the amount of plaintiffs claim for damages does not exceed twenty-five thousand
dollars ($25,000), there shall be taxed and allowed to the claimant, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable amount
to be fixed by the court as attorney's fees. For the plaintiff to be awarded attorney's fees for the prosecution of the action,
written demand for payment of the claim and a statement of claim must have been served on the defendant's insurer, if
known, or if there is no known insurer, then on the defendant, not less than sixty (60) days before the commencement of
the action; provided that no attorney's fees shall be allowed to the plaintiff if the court finds that the defendant tendered
to the plaintiff, prior to the commencement of the action, an amount at least equal to ninety percent (90%) of the amount
awarded to the plaintiff.
The term "statement of claim" shall mean a written statement signed by the plaintiffs attorney, or if no attorney, by
the plaintiff which includes:

(a) An itemized statement of each and every item of damage claimed by the plaintiff including the amount claimed for
general damages and the following items of special damages: (i) medical bills incurred up to the date of the plaintiffs

§

uc;,iHauu,

(ii) a good faith estimate of future medicai
a good faith estimate of future loss of

all medical

lost income incurred up to the date of the plaintiffs
and
for which the
has not

bills and other documentation

to

If the plaintiff includes in the complaint filed to commence the action, or in evidence offered at trial, a different alleged
injury or a significant new item of damage not set forth in the statement of claim, the plaintiff shall be deemed to have
waived any entitlement to attorney's fees under this section.

(5) In all instances where a party is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs under subsection(!), (2), (3) or (4) of
this section, such party shall also be entitled to reasonable postjudgment attorney's fees and costs incurred in attempting
to collect on the judgment. Such attorney's fees and costs shall be set by the court following the filing of a memorandum
of attorney's fees and costs with notice to all parties and hearing.

(6) In any small claims case resulting in entry of a money judgment or judgment for recovery of specific property, the party
in whose favor the judgment is entered shall be entitled to reasonable postjudgment attorney's fees and costs incurred in
attempting to collect on the judgment. Such attorney's fees and costs shall be set by the court following the filing of a
memorandum of attorney's fees and costs with notice to all parties and an opportunity for hearing. The amount of such
attorney's fees shall be determined by the court after consideration of the factors set out in rule 54(e)(3) of the Idaho
rules of civil procedure, or any future rule that the supreme court of the state of Idaho may promulgate, but the court
shall not base its determination of such fees upon any contingent fees arrangement between attorney and client, or any
arrangement setting such fees as a percentage of the judgment or the amount recovered. In no event shall postjudgment
attorney's fees exceed the principal amount of the judgment or value of property recovered.

Credits
Added by S.L. 1970, ch. 44, § 1. Amended by S.L. 1975, ch. 65, § l; S.L. 1986, ch. 205, § 1; S.L. 1987, ch. 204, § 1; S.L. 1988,
ch. 343, § 1; S.L. 1994, ch. 353, § 1; S.L. 1996, ch. 383, § l; S.L. 2001, ch. 161, § 1; S.L. 2012, ch. 94, § 1, eff. July 1, 2012.
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Rule

appearance, ID R RCP Rule 4.

Idaho Rules of ChiI Procedure (LR.C.P .), Rule 4.1
Formerly cited as ID R RCP Rule 4(i)

Rule 4.1. General or special appearance
Currentness
(a) General Appearance. The voluntary appearance of a party or service of any pleading by the party, except as provided

in subsection (b) of this Ride, constitutes voluntary submission to the personal jurisdiction of the court.

(b) Motion or Special Appearance to Contest Personal Jurisdiction. The following do not constitute a voluntary
appearance by a party under this R1Jl,e:

(1) a motion under f!~~ 12(b)(2), (4) or (5), whether raised before or after judgment;

(2) a motion under

40(a) or (b);

(3) a motion for an extension of time to answer or otherwise appear;

(4) the joinder of other defenses in a motion under lt:i,l~ 12(b)(2), (4) or (5);

(5) a response to discovery or to a motion filed by another party after a party files a motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4) or
(5), action taken by that party in responding to discovery or to a motion filed by another party;

(6) pleading further and defending an action by a party whose motion under Rule 12(b)(2), (4), or (5) is denied; or

(7) filing a document entitled "special appearance," which does not seek relief but merely provides notice that the party
is entering a special appearance to contest personal jurisdiction, if a motion under i1J~<1 12(b)(2), (4), or (5) is filed within
fourteen (14) days after filing the special appearance, or within such later time as the court permits.

Credits
[Adopted March l, 2016, effective July 1, 2016. Amended effective September 9, 2016.]

R,mt Civ. Proc., Bil§ 4.1, ID R RCPBQl~ 4.1
Current with amendments received through 11/15/16.

@

2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government vVorks.

. General or
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Tllorncion

allowed; Form of motions and other papers, ID R RCP Rule

Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (I.R.C.P.), Rule 7
Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; Form of motions and other papers
Cu1Tentness
(a) Pleadings. Only these pleadings are allowed:

(I) a complaint;

(2) an answer to a complaint;

(3) an answer to a counterclaim designated as a counterclaim;

(4) an answer to a cross claim;

(5) a third party complaint;

(6) an answer to a third party complaint; and

(7) if the court orders one, a reply to an answer.

(b) Motions and Other Papers.

(1) In General. A request for a court order must be made by motion. That motion must:

(A) be in writing unless made during a hearing or trial;

(B) state with particularity the grounds for the relief sought including the number of the applicable civil rule, if any;

(C) state the relief sought; and

(2) Proposed Order. A proposed form of order, if included, must be a separate document.

WESTlAW @ 2016 Thomson Reuters, No c!airn to
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memoranda or briefs
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must be filed
the
by the parties at least 14 days prior to the day designated for hearing.

the
if any,
if
served so as be received

(B) Affidavit(s) opposing the motion and opposing memoranda or briefs, if any, must be filed with the court and
served so as to be received by the parties at least 7 days before the hearing.

(C) The moving party may file a reply brief or memorandum, which must be filed with the court and served so as to

be received by the parties at least 2 days prior to the hearing.

(D) The moving party must indicate on the face of the motion whether oral argument is desired. If a brief or
memorandum is not filed with the motion, the motion must indicate on the face of the motion whether the party
intends to file a brief or memorandum supporting the motion.

(E) If the moving party does not request oral argument or does not timely file a supporting memorandum or brief, the
court may deny the motion without further notice if it determines the motion does not have merit.

(F) If oral argument has been requested on any motion, the court may deny oral argument by written or oral notice
from the court at least 1 day prior to the hearing. The court may limit oral argument at any time.

(G) If the office of the presiding judge is outside of the county in which the action is pending, the parties must
simultaneously provide a copy of any notice, motion, affidavit, brief, or other document relating to a motion to the
presiding judge in addition to filing the materials with the court of record.

(H) Any exception to the time limits in this rule may be granted by the court for good cause shown. If time does
not permit a hearing or response on a motion to extend or shorten time, the court may rule without opportunity for
response or hearing.

(I) The time limits in this rule do not apply to motions and other matters if a different time limit is provided by statute
or by another rule of civil procedure.

Credits
[Adopted March I, 2016, effective July l, 2016.]
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presented; ... , ID R RCP Rule 12

West's Idaho Code Annotated
Court Rules
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure

m.
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (I.R.C.P.), Rule 12
Rule

12.

Defenses and objections: When and how presented; Motion for judgment

on the pleadings; Consolidating motions; Waiving defenses; Hearings before trial
Currentness
(a) Time to Serve a Responsive Pleading.

(I) In General. Unless another time is specified by rule or statute, the time for serving a responsive pleading is as follows:

(A) a defendant must serve an answer within 21 days after being served with the summons and complaint;

(B) a party must serve an answer to a counterclaim or crossclaim within 21 days after being served with the pleading
that states the counterclaim or crossclaim;

(C) a party must serve a reply to an answer 21 days after being served with an order to reply, unless the court specifies
a different time.

(2) Effect of a Motion. Unless the court sets a different time, serving a motion under this rule alters these periods as
follows:

(A) if the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until trial, the responsive pleading must be served within
14 days after notice of the court's action; or

(B) if the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive pleading must be served within 14 days
after the more definite statement is served.

(b) How to Present Defenses. Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim or third party claim, must be asserted in the responsive pleading if one is required. But a party
may assert the following defenses by motion:

(I) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction;

(2) lack of personal jurisdiction;

WESTLAW i) 2016 Thomson Reuters No claim to

U.S. Government Works.

Defenses and

process;

insufficient service of process;

(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted;

(7) failure to join a party under Rule 19; and

(8) another action pending between the same parties for the same cause.

If a pleading states a claim for relief that does not require a responsive pleading, an opposing party may assert at trial
any defense to that claim.

(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. After the pleadings are closed, but early enough not to delay trial, a party may

move for judgment on the pleadings.

(d) Result of Presenting Matters Outside the Pleadings. If, on a motion under Rule l2(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the

pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under
Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.

(e) Motion for a More Definite Statement. A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a

responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.
The motion must be made before filing a responsive pleading and must point out the defects complained of and the
details desired. If the court orders a more definite statement and the order is not obeyed within 14 days after notice of
the order or within the time the court sets, the court may strike the pleading or issue any other appropriate order.

(l) Motion to Strike. The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,

impertinent, or scandalous matter. The court may act:

(l) on its own; or

(2) on motion made by a party either before responding to the pleading or, if a response is not allowed, within 21 days
after being served with the pleading.

(g) Joining Motions.
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Rule 12. Defenses and objections: When and

presented; ... , ID R RCP Rule 12

(I) Right to Join. A motion under this rule may be joined with any other motion allowed by this rule or by filing a special
appearance under Rule 4.1.

(2) Limitation
Further Afotions. Except as
in Rule 12(h)(2) or
that makes a motion under this
rule must not make another motion under this rule raising a defense or objection that was available to the party but
omitted from its earlier motion.

(h) Waiving and Preserving Certain Defenses.

(1) When Some are Waived. A party waives any defense listed in subsections (b)(2),(4) and (5) by failing to make it by
motion before filing a responsive pleading or filing any other motion, except a motion for an extension of time to answer
or otherwise appear or a motion to disqualify a judge under Rule 40(a) or (b).

(2) When to Raise Others. Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, to join a person required by Rule
19 or 19 .1, a defense of another action pending between the same parties for the same cause, or to state a legal defense
to a claim may be raised:

(A) in any pleading allowed or ordered under Rule 7(a);

(B) by a motion under Rule 12(c); or

(C) at trial.

(3) Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the
court must dismiss the action.

(4) Improper Venue. An objection to improper venue is waived unless a timely motion for proper venue is made as
provided in Rule 40.1.

(i) Hearing Before Trial. If a party so moves, any defense listed in Rule 12(b)(l)-(7), whether made in a pleading or by
motion, and a motion under Rule 12(c) must be heard and decided before trial unless the court orders a deferral un ti! trial.

Credits
[Adopted March l, 2016, effective July 1, 2016. Amended effective September 9, 2016.]
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Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (I.R.C.P.), Rule 54
Rule 54. Judgments; Costs

(a) Definition-Form--Amendments.

(1) Definition and Form of Judgment. "Judgment" as used in these rules means a separate document entitled "Judgment"

or "Decree". A judgment must state the relief to which a party is entitled on one or more claims for relief in the action,
which may include dismissal with or without prejudice. A judgment must not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of
a master, the record of prior proceedings, the court's legal reasoning, findings of fact, or conclusions of law. A judgment
is final if either it is a partial judgment that has been certified as final pursuant to subsection (b)(l) of this rule or
judgment has been entered on all claims for relief, except costs and fees, asserted by or against all parties in the action.
A judgment or partial judgment must begin with the words "JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: .. ," and it
must not contain any other wording between those words and the caption. A judgment may include any findings of fact
or conclusions of law expressly required by statute, rule, or regulation.

(2) Amended Judgments. If the court orders an amendment to a judgment, the amendment will be effective only after

the court enters an amended judgment setting forth all of the terms of the new judgment, including those terms of the
prior judgment that remain in effect.

(b) Partial Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties.

(l) Certificate of Partial Judgment as Final. When an action presents more than one claim for relief, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct entry of a
final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there
is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any judgment, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or
the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may
be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties' rights and liabilities.
In the event the trial court determines that a partial judgment should be certified as final under this Rule 54(b), the
court must execute a certificate which must immediately follow the court's signature on the partial judgment and be in
substantially the form found in Appendix B.

(2) Jurisdiction if Appealed After Rule 54 ( b) Certificate. If a Rule 54(b) Certificate is issued on a partial judgment and

an appeal is filed, the trial court loses all jurisdiction over the entire action, except as provided in Rule 13 of the Idaho
Appellate Rules.
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Demand for Judgment; Relief to be Granted. A default judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount,

what is demanded in the pleadings. Every other final judgment should grant the relief to which each party is entitled,
even if the party has not demanded that relief in its pleadings.

(d) Costs.

(!) In General; Items Allowed.

(A) Parties Entitled to Costs. Except when otherwise limited by these rules, costs are allowed as a matter of right to
the prevailing party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court.

(B) Prevailing Party. In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court
must, in its sound discretion, consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the
respective parties. The trial court may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in
part, and on so finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after
considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action and the resulting judgment or judgments obtained.

(C) Costs as a Matter of Right. When costs are awarded to a party, that party is entitled to the following costs, actually
paid, as a matter of right:

(i) court filing fees;

(ii) actual fees for service of any pleading or document in the action, whether served by a public officer or other
person;

(iii) witness fees of$20.00 per day for each day that a witness, other than a party or expert, testifies at a deposition
or in the trial of an action;

(iv) travel expenses of witnesses who travel by private transportation, other than a party, who testify in the trial of
an action, computed at the rate of $.30 per mile, one way, from the place of residence, whether it is in or outside
the state of Idaho;

(v) travel expenses of witnesses who travel other than by private transportation, other than a party, computed as
the actual travel expenses of the witness, but not more than $.30 per mile, one way, from the place of residence of
the witness, whether it is in or outside the state of Idaho;

of

a

other exhibits admitted in
of such exhibits of each party;

(viii) cost of all bond premiums;

(ix) reasonable expert witness fees for an expert who testifies at a deposition or at a triai of an action, but not more
than $2,000 for each expert witness for all appearances;

(x) charges for reporting and transcribing of a deposition taken in preparation for trial of an action, whether or not
read into evidence in the trial of an action; and

(xi) charges for one (I) copy of any deposition taken by any of the parties to the action in preparation for trial of
the action;
The trial court may, on objection, disallow any of the above-described costs on a finding that the costs were not
reasonably incurred; were incurred for the purpose of harassment; were incurred in bad faith; or were incurred for
the purpose of increasing the costs to any other party. The mere fact that a deposition is not used in the trial of an
action, either as evidence read into the record or for the purposes of impeachment, does not indicate that the taking
of the deposition was not reasonable, or that a copy of a deposition was not reasonably obtained, or that the cost of
the deposition should otherwise be disallowed, so long as its taking was reasonable for trial preparation.

(D) Discretionary Costs. Additional items of cost not enumerated in, or in an amount in excess of that listed in subpart
(C), may be allowed on a showing that the costs were necessary and exceptional costs, reasonably incurred, and should
in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party. The trial court, in ruling on objections to discretionary
costs, must make express findings as to why the item of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed. In the
absence of any objection to an item of discretionary costs, the court may disallow on its own motion any items and
must make express findings supporting such disallowance.

(E) Costs Incurred by the Court. The Court may assess and apportion as costs, between and among the parties to the
action, all fees and expenses of masters, receivers or expert witnesses appointed by the court in the action.

(F) Costs and Attorney Fees--Fees on Execution of Judgment--Added to Judgment. All costs and attorney fees
approved by the court and fees for the service of the writ of execution upon a judgment are automatically added to
the judgment as costs and collected by the sheriff in addition to the amount of the judgment and other allowed costs.
In the event the return of the sheriff on a writ of execution indicates that the service costs were not obtained through
the service of the writ, the clerk of the court must automatically add the uncollected service fees to the judgment as
additional costs.

Multiple Parties. In the event judgment is entered in favor of multiple parties or coparties, costs must be allowed as
a matter of course to each of the prevailing parties unless the court otherwise directs.

Costs, ID R RCP Rule 54

(4) Afemorandum of Costs. At any time after the verdict of a jury or a decision of the court, but not later than 14 days after
entry of judgment, any party who claims costs may file and serve on adverse parties a memorandum of costs, itemizing
each claimed expense. The memorandum must state that to the best of the party's knowledge and belief the items are
correct and that the costs claimed are in compliance with this rule. Failure to timely file a memorandum of costs is a
waiver of the right to costs. A memorandum of costs prematurely filed is considered as timely.

(5) Objections to Costs. Within 14 days of service of a memorandum of costs, any party may object by filing and serving
a motion to disallow part or all of the costs. The motion does not stay execution on the judgment, exclusive of costs, and
must be heard and determined by the court as other motions under these rules. Failure to timely object to the items in
the memorandum of costs constitutes a waiver of all objections to the costs claimed.

(6) Settlement of Costs by Order of Court. After a hearing on a motion to disallow costs, or after the time for filing the
motion has passed, the court must enter an order settling the dollar amount of costs, if any, awarded to any party to
the action.

<Text of subrule (e) effective until March I, 2017.>
(e) Attorney Fees.

(1) Pursuant to Contract or Statute. In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, including paralegal
fees, to the prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)( I )(B), when provided for by any statute or contract.

(2) Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121. Attorney fees under Idaho Code Section 12-121 may be awarded by the court
only when it finds that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation,
which finding must be in writing and include the basis and reasons for the award. No attorney fees may be awarded
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-121 on a default judgment.

(3) Amount of Attorney Fees. If the court grants attorney fees to a party or parties in a civil action it must consider the
following in determining the amount of such fees:

(A) the time and labor required;

(B) the novelty and difficulty of the questions;

(C) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and ability of the attorney in the particular
field of law;
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whether the fee is fixed

(F) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case;

(G) the amount invoived and the results obtained;

(H) the undesirability of the case;

(I) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

(J) a wards in similar cases;

(K) the reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted Legal Research), if the court finds it was
reasonably necessary in preparing a party's case;

(L) any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular case.

(4) Pleading; Default Judgments.

(A) In General. It is not necessary for any party in a civil action to assert a claim for attorney fees in any pleading.

(B) In Default Judgment. When attorney fees are requested pursuant to contract or a statute other than Idaho Code
section 12-121 in a judgment by default, the amount of attorney fees in the event of default must be included in the
prayer for relief in the complaint and the award must not exceed the amount in the prayer. An award of attorney fees
under Idaho Code section 12-120 in default judgments where the defendant has not appeared must not exceed the
amount of the judgment for the claim, exclusive of costs.

(5) Attorney Fees as Costs. Attorney fees, when allowable by statute or contract, are costs in an action and processed in
the same manner as other costs and included in the memorandum of costs. A claim for attorney fees as costs must be
supported by an affidavit of the attorney stating the basis and method of computation.

(6) Objection to Attorney Fees. Any objection to a claim for attorney fees must be made in the same manner as an
objection to costs as provided by Rule 54(d)(5). The court may conduct an evidentiary hearing, ifit deems it necessary,
regarding the award of attorney fees.
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Claims to Which Rule Applies. Any claim for attorney fees, including claims pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-121,
must be made pursuant to Rule 54(e) unless an applicable statute or contract provides otherwise.

<Text ofsubrule (e) effective March 1, 2017.>
(e) Attorney Fees.

(l) Pursuant to Contract or Statute. In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, including paralegal
fees, to the prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B), when provided for by any statute or contract.

(2) Amount of attorney fees. If the court grants attorney fees to a party or parties in a civil action it must consider the
following in determining the amount of such fees:

(A) the time and labor required;

(B) the novelty and difficulty of the questions;

(C) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and ability of the attorney in the particular
field of law;

(D) the prevailing charges for like work;

(E) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;

(F) the time iimitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case;

(G) the amount involved and the results obtained;

(H) the undesirability of the case;

the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

Costs, ID R RCP Rule 54
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(L) any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular case.

(3) Pleading, Defuuit Judgments.

(A) In General. It is not necessary for any party in a civil action to assert a claim for attorney fees in any pleading.

(B) In Default Judgment. When attorney fees are requested pursuant to contract or a statute in a judgment by default,
the amount of attorney fees in the event of default must be included in the prayer for relief in the complaint and the
award must not exceed the amount in the prayer. An award of attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-120 in
default judgments where the defendant has not appeared must not exceed the amount of the judgment for the claim,
exclusive of costs.

(4) Attorney Fees as Costs. Attorney fees, when allowable by statute or contract, are costs in an action and processed in
the same manner as other costs and included in the memorandum of costs. A claim for attorney fees as costs must be
supported by an affidavit of the attorney stating the basis and method of computation.

(5) Objection to Attorney Fees. Any objection to a claim for attorney fees must be made in the same manner as an
objection to costs as provided by Rule 54(d)(5). The court may conduct an evidentiary hearing, ifit deems it necessary,
regarding the award of attorney fees.

(6) Settlement of Attorney Fees by Order of Court; Determination Not Binding on Attorney and Client. After a hearing on
an objection to attorney fees, or after the time for filing an objection has passed, the court must enter an order settling
the dollar amount of attorney fees, if any, awarded to any party to the action. If there was a timely objection to the
amount of attorney fees, the court must include in the order its reasoning and the factors it relied on in determining the
amount of the award. The allowance of attorney fees by the court under this rule is not to be construed as fixing the
fees between attorney and client.

(7) Claims to Which Rule Applies. Any claim for attorney fees, including claims pursuant to Idaho Code section 12- l 2 l,

must be made pursuant to Rule 54(e) unless an applicable statute or contract provides otherwise.

Credits
[Adopted March l, 2016, effective July!, 2016. Amended April 27, 2016, effective July l, 2016; October 6, 2016, effective
March!, 2017.]

Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 54, ID R RCP Rule 54
Current with amendments received through 11/15/16.
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Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (I.R.C.P.), Rule 60
Rule 60. Relief from a judgment or order
Currentness
(a) Corrections Based on Clerical Mistakes; Oversights and Omissions. The court may correct a clerical mistake or a

mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or other part of the record. The
court may do so on motion or on its own, with or without notice. But after an appeal has been docketed in the appellate
court and while it is pending, such a mistake may be corrected only with the appellate court's leave.

(b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding. On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a

party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new
trial under Rule 59(b);

(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;

(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or
vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; or

( 6) any other reason that justifies relief.

( c) Timing and Effect of the Motion.

(l) Timing. A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more
than 6 months after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.

(2) Effect on Finality. The motion does not affect the judgment's finality or suspend its operation.
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Powers

Grant Relief. This

to set aside, as provided by law, within one year after judgment was entered, a judgment obtained against a party
who was not personally served with summons and complaint either in the state of Idaho or in any other jurisdiction,
and who has failed to appear in the action; or

(3) set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.

Credits

[Adopted March I, 2016, effective July 1, 2016.]
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